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DISCUSSION AND CORRESPONDENCE

ANTI-PROFESSIONS

A Reply to Dr A. L. Kroeber

In the second number of Vol. 17 of the *American Anthropologist* Dr A. L. Kroeber has published an article in which he expounds his anthropological creeds in the form of "Eighteen Professions." They have induced me to reply in a number of "Anti-Professions."

Dr Kroeber's distinction of historical anthropology, history, and sociology as history, and physical anthropology and psychology as biology is dogmatic. What empirical justification is there for labeling psychology as biology and for ostracizing all psychic phenomena which do not happen to be open to physiological experimentation from the horizon of our inquiries? To arbitrarily blindfold science towards any group of real phenomena whatsoever is an assault on scientific open-mindedness. Only such dogmatism can lead to the conception of anthropology as "no-man's land" and a "picnic-ground." The young field of anthropology is virgin soil. The infiniteness of its potentialities is open to the vision of the scholar, if he will but keep his eyes open. It becomes a "picnic-ground" as soon as he surrenders the naïveté of his vision and commits the cardinal sin of arbitrary elimination. Such is the case, when the anthropologist begins his work by an aprioristic attempt to delimitate "the scope of history from that of science." Delimitations of this kind can be conceived epistemologically only as the ultimate transcendental ends of our understanding. If formulated at the outset of our work, they are scholastic dogmas, because the relativity of their schematism lays claim to the absolute.

Fields of investigation cannot be "surveyed" and "fenced" in the true sense of the word. "Fences" are but heuristic and subjective institutions demanded by the practical necessity of specialization. The less fences disturb our vision, the better for our view of the unity of the world of experiences. A fence between "history and science" is a bureaucratic police regulation.

(See first profession.) A definition of the "aim of history" clouds our vision by means of a normative formula. All real problems of history

are suggested by the world of experiences itself, not by a subjective norm of what the aim of history *ought* to be.

The demarkations of the various lines of inquiry are traditional and never inherent in the problems themselves.

(See second profession.) To limit the subject of historical inquiry to the *works* of man and to bar man himself in his psychical actuality from this inquiry is not feasible because self-contradictory. The man is his acts and the acts are the man. What possible meaning can there be in the statement that in religion, for instance, the man is distinct from his beliefs, "the manifestations" of his "activities"?

(See third profession.) A history "which is not concerned with the agencies producing civilization, but with civilization as such" is either a history à la Graebner or a philosophy that postulates "the entity civilization" as a Platonic idea.

The anthropologist is in a similar sense a psychologist as the psychologist proper is a physiologist. The psychology of the anthropologist is a real psychology applied to his specific field of inquiries.

(See fourth profession.) If the historian should, as Dr Kroeber states, interpret man's mind by the direct application of his own psychic activities, the admittance is tacitly made that he may deal with a form of popular psychology. What valid objection can there then be to the use and elaboration by the anthropologist—or if you like, historian,—of a really scientific method of psychological analysis and comparison?

(See fifth profession.) "True instincts" that "lie at the bottom and origin of social phenomena" is an expression that partakes of the vagueness of popular psychology. A discussion of the relation of these "instincts" to "social facts" is only feasible on the basis of a scientific psychological analysis of the specific phenomena involved.

(See sixth profession.) "The personal or individual" as an actual factor in all cultural life offers *real* problems. Whether these problems be labeled as historical, anthropological, or psychological, leads to a conflict of words.

(See fourteenth profession.) The statement that the process of the interaction of individual minds is "merely physiological" is but a specific expression of the dogma that psychology is biology. Conclusions are predetermined by the premises.

(See fifteenth profession.) To say that "there are no laws in history similar to the laws of physico-chemical science" is to state a tautology, masked by a confusion of concepts. The term "history" in itself implies that in its pursuit the focus of our interests is distinct

from that of those inquiries which are bent on finding "laws." In comparing "history" with physico-chemical science, it is not the heterogeneity of the objective empirical facts themselves that characterizes the one as finding "laws" in contradistinction to the other, but it is rather the fundamental difference of what in the two types of inquiry arouses our scientific curiosity. If we would approach the cultural phenomena of "history" from the same point of view as does the chemistry of which Dr Kroeber speaks, we would also find "laws," as philology, for instance actually does in the case of its generalizations. Indeed, natural science may also shift its focus of interest to the "historical" point of view. Where are the laws for example, that the geologist finds when he studies the historical genesis of the geological configuration of a certain geographical area?

(See sixteenth and seventeenth professions.) The statement that the relations between cultural phenomena are "relations of sequence, not of effect" is a *contradictio in adjecto*. What is the principle of causality but the sequence of phenomena conceived in terms of logical correlation? Dr Kroeber's distinction between conditions *sine qua non* and causes exemplifies this confusion of logical concepts. The same fallible logic is implied in the assertion that "the causality of history is teleological." The principle of teleology is nothing more or less than the inversion of the principle of causality. They refer to opposite points of view in the logical interrelation of phenomena.¹ It is thus obviously meaningless to say that a certain kind of causality is teleological.

CONCLUSION

The cardinal conviction which Dr Kroeber professes is, if I understand him correctly, that a sharp line of division must be drawn between history and science (p. 283). Science must be absolutely eliminated from history and "historical anthropology." While it is difficult to ascertain what Dr Kroeber means by "history," it is clear how he conceives the scope of "science." It comprises that category of inquiries which deals with mechanical causality. Biology is science and psychology is biology. Psychology, as a branch of science, is therefore taboo in history and in "historical anthropology."

Every line of the "professions" whispers to us the moral of the whole argument: the psychologist must not meddle in the *métier* of the historian. The psychologist is a scientist and the historian is something else, whatever that may be. Psychology is the bugaboo that has con-

¹ See Wundt, *Logik*, 3rd edition, Vol. I, p. 629 et seq.

verted anthropology into a "picnic-ground." But like most bugaboos Dr Kroeber's psychological bugaboo is a gnome of subjective making. It exists only for him. For whom else is psychology biological? Such a categorical characterization is absolutely adverse to the objective nature of the problems of psychology. This science, which deals with the mind and *all* of its expressions, is *per se* the link between the natural sciences on the one hand and the mental sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) on the other. This absolutely unique characteristic of psychology finds its expression in the various methods this science employs. Thus the experimental method in psychology is conditioned by specific physiological expressions of psychic life. But equally justifiable, because determined by other types of expression of the same actuality, is the method of psychological analysis and comparison,—which method is elaborated in the historical *Geisteswissenschaften*.

The relation of "historical anthropology" to psychology is very similar to the relation of psychology to physiology. Modern psychology is inconceivable without physiology. Anthropology has as yet not perceived its relation to psychology with equal clearness. To build a high wall around "historical anthropology", as Dr Kroeber would have it, and to order psychology to stay out, is equally reasonable as to let psychologists lay claim to the brain and forbid the physiologist and anatomist to trespass. Let us remember that in all scientific work there is only specialization, no *métiers*.

As soon as Dr Kroeber will have become conscious of the dogmatism of his biological psychology, all other obstacles towards an understanding must fall like a house of cards. He will recognize the impossibility of building a cloister-wall about history, he will no longer look askance on the psychologically inclined anthropologist as a hybrid form of two distinct crafts, psychology will no longer be a bugaboo—in short there will be complete unison of the "professions" and the "anti-professions."

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NEANDERTAL MAN IN SPAIN: THE LOWER JAW OF BAÑOLAS

It is not generally realized that the first skeletal remains of what is now known as *Homo neandertalensis*, or Mousterian man, were found in Spain at Gibraltar in 1848. This preceded the discovery in the valley of the Neander by nine years. In many respects the Gibraltar skull is still one of the most important specimens of this type of early man.